Ruins of Palestine

On the First Anniversary of the Deadliest Terror Attack in Israel's History

A year after Hamas's terrorist attack on Israel and the beginning of the Israeli military’s retaliatory operation in the Gaza Strip, it’s clear that the chances for an independent Palestinian state are rapidly diminishing. The phrase "Arab-Israeli settlement" has lost all meaning, and peace in the Middle East seems further away than ever. All of this plays into the hands of those who planned the October 7, 2023, attack — Hamas's leadership.

In the far north of the Gaza Strip, there was an abandoned amusement park named "Palestine," slowly falling into ruin over the years. Behind the park’s stone walls, one could see rusting carousels and a leaning Ferris wheel, on which no one had ridden for many years. Entering the park was forbidden, monitored by a guard stationed by Hamas, which had long been the sole authority in the region. Perhaps Hamas had dug its infamous tunnels beneath the crumbling attractions and didn’t want outsiders to find out. Or maybe they hid rockets and ammunition under the Ferris wheel. Either way, the small "Palestine" park seemed like a metaphor for the larger Palestine: destruction, hopelessness, and an angry unshaven old man from Hamas guarding this hopelessness so that no outsider could witness it.

“Palestine” park in Gaza Strip (photo by Yuriy Matsarsky)

Most likely, nothing remains of the "Palestine" park after the past year. The war ravaged the north of the Gaza Strip, as tanks and artillery leveled everything to dust. Here, too, one can see a metaphor: On October 7, 2023, Hamas ignited a war that destroyed the "Palestine" park and left even less hope for the emergence of a real independent state, after which the park was named. This is perhaps the main result of the first year of the new large-scale war in Gaza.

Over the past year, various theories, of varying degrees of plausibility, have emerged about why Hamas launched an operation that led to the destruction of thousands of homes in Gaza, countless deaths among the residents of the Strip, and only strengthened the resolve of Israelis and their allies that a Palestinian state should not exist. Commentators suggested that Hamas started the war hoping that Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iran, and other friendly forces would join their side. Or that Iran initiated the attack through Hamas, hoping to destroy the Jewish state, which Tehran has considered its main enemy for 45 years.

In any case, most assumptions revolved around the idea that Hamas genuinely planned to defeat Israel. But perhaps they miscalculated, relied too much on unreliable allies, or simply overestimated their strength and, instead of a triumphant victory, received a massacre of biblical proportions.

However, we shouldn't rule out the possibility that Hamas didn’t expect a military victory, nor did they have real plans to destroy Israel. Hamas may be terrorists, but they are unlikely to be complete fools. The group’s leadership understood well that Israel is not just stronger but incomparably stronger than any army Hamas could mobilize. The Israelis have tanks, aviation, precision bombs, electronic reconnaissance tools, and satellite data. No one could seriously expect victory over all of this with militants on hang gliders and makeshift rockets, which stand little chance against Israel’s missile defense systems. In other words, the operation may have been planned as a military failure from the start — or at least, only in the military sense. After all, Hamas is not just a militant group; it is also a political organization with serious ambitions.

Hamas's political platform has always been based on a categorical denial of Israel’s right to exist. Their radicalism and uncompromising stance gained the group considerable popularity among many Palestinians after former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and his political allies renounced armed struggle in the 1990s and recognized Israel. In return, Israel agreed to limited autonomy for the Palestinian territories, though under constant surveillance by the Israeli army and security forces. Arafat and his team saw this concession as the first step toward the recognition of Palestinian statehood by Israel. From time to time, statements were made in Israel suggesting that an independent Palestine would eventually appear on the world map (even Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has carefully hinted at this). However, radicals insisted that no compromise with the Israelis was possible. They called for preparing for war and the expulsion of all Jews, followed by declaring all Israeli territory part of a Palestinian state. Among these radicals, Hamas stood out the most. In the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, Hamas won 44% of the vote — more than any other party. However, Hamas quickly grew tired of playing by the rules of public politics, which require considering opponents' views. Just a few months after their electoral triumph, they staged a coup in Gaza, eliminating or expelling all significant competitors and seizing full control of the region. The blockade of Gaza that followed, imposed by Israel and neighboring Egypt, effectively trapped Hamas within a small strip of land.

Few would call Hamas’s years of uncontested rule over Gaza a success. Unemployment raged in the region, occasional epidemics of dangerous diseases, like cholera, flared up, and the territory was used for launching rockets at Israel, which responded with strikes that only deepened Gaza's devastation. Hamas achieved no social or economic victories. Its legitimacy relied almost exclusively on its radical anti-Israel stance, which remained popular among Palestinians. With popularity came money. Hamas would never have been able to provide even the bare minimum of resources to Gaza, as the region’s economy collapsed due to the blockade. For years, Hamas was financially sustained by external sponsors, primarily Iran, though not exclusively. Salaries for officials in Gaza (all Hamas appointees, of course) were paid by Qatar, Saudi Arabia funded the rebuilding of destroyed homes, and food and medicine were purchased with funds from the United Arab Emirates. Money also came from the US and Europe, but these nations closely monitored how it was spent. Thus, such funds were unlikely to be used by Hamas leaders for parties in Cairo clubs or trips to luxury resorts, while cash from Middle Eastern sponsors, often delivered in suitcases, could be.

Hamas’s leadership lived outside the region, often in considerable luxury, while Gaza sank further into poverty. For Gaza’s poor, Hamas always had slogans and calls for uncompromising struggle at the ready. Meanwhile, the group's leaders spent increasingly large sums on themselves and their families. But the normalization of Israel’s relations with Arab countries in recent years threatened to disrupt this established system. Under pressure from Washington, which acted as the main mediator in these negotiations, Middle Eastern nations promised to reconsider their approach to financing the Palestinians. The money could have shifted away from Hamas and toward less radical but still popular parties and organizations among Arabs. So, what should corrupt and inefficient party managers with a terrorist background do in such a situation? Discredit moderate competitors, undermine their influence, and demonstrate their impotence. Here are the moderate parties and movements that had been promising for decades to achieve the creation of a Palestinian state through negotiations. And here is the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack, with an unprecedented number of civilian casualties among Israelis, followed by the Israeli parliament’s decision rejecting even the possibility of discussing Palestinian statehood. In other words, Hamas single-handedly wiped out any peaceful politics and dialogue efforts. Who will now support those who promised an independent Palestine for thirty years but now find themselves powerless? Who will send them money?

Up to 40% of Palestinians support Hamas, while their closest competitor, the moderate Fatah, has half as much support. The normalization of Israel’s relations with Arab states is on hold, which is also a consequence of the terror attack a year ago. Israel’s actions in Gaza, which led to the deaths of many thousands of civilians, have outraged public opinion in Arab countries, forcing their leaders to delay normalization. Hamas could potentially benefit from this too. Their emissaries are actively collecting money in the Middle East (and possibly in the West) to help Gaza's residents. Whether these funds will truly go toward medicine and food for the poor, or be spent on new villas for Hamas's leadership, remains an open question.

What is beyond doubt, however, is that Hamas's leadership has benefited the most from the terror attack a year ago and the subsequent war in Gaza. The party’s popularity is nearing record levels, normalization between Israel and Arab states is on the brink of collapse, and the flow of money continues. Hamas leaders can comfortably continue living their lavish lifestyles in Doha, Istanbul, or Cairo. As for Gaza, reduced to rubble, with thousands dead, disabled, or homeless — for Hamas’s top brass, this is likely a price they are willing to pay for their own comfort.